My old flag

The only thing this posting has in common with Hexagon is that I   survived some terrible experiences during World War II, otherwise I would not have had the opportunity to work on this “career job.”

 Most of you with whom I worked for so long at PE do not know that I am a Holocaust survivor. I was born in Belgium and when the Nazis invaded my parents and I escaped to France. We were in hiding there for 5 years in various locations. In 1944 at the age of seven I was separated from my parents. I was sheltered by a kind Catholic family in a small village that happened to be a center for the French underground.

 Not only did I live and witness many shootings, bombings, killings and extremely frightening things, I was so lonely and heartsick being separated from my parents. I am still somewhat traumatized by this. Fortunately we were eventually re-united.

 When the United States army started liberating France in September of 1944, during a rare visit by my parents to this village, my mother made me a French flag to wave to the liberating troops as they were to pass by that village. This is a photo of that 75-year old moth eaten flag that I have hanging in my office in archival protective material.

French flag.jpg

I personally drew with a light blue color pencil the “Cross of Lorraine” symbol of Charles De Gaulle’s Free French group in the middle of the flag. It is one of the few articles I have of my youth other than my memories.

 These experiences are why I totally understand and empathize about the horrible and cruel treatment of today’s immigrant children separated from their parent and caged in this country’s crowded “concentration camps.” It is inhumane treatment and needs to be stopped. This is my political statement.

 Immigrants were and are major contributors to most of the major American milestones, scientific, art, music, sports, health, technology and literature.

 Phil Pressel

 

 

 

 

Technology Related to Hexagon at Perkin-Elmer

During the development and design of the Hexagon spy satellite system starting in 1966, with the first launch 5 years later in June 1971 and continuing on we at Perkin-Elmer did not have the following technologies until much later in the program and yet we achieved great success on the most complicated satellite of its day and perhaps still today.

  • NO CAD

  • NO MICROPROCESSORS

  • NO LED’S, NO CCD’S

  • LIMITED COMPUTER USE

  • NO POCKET CALCULATORS

  • NO DIGITAL PRINTERS (tracing paper drawings were converted to blueprints using large ammonia machines)

The tools we used were:

  • The Abacus (not really)

  • The slide rule

  • eventually the pocket calculator

  • eventually much more sophisticated computers programs

None the less our talented staff proudly developed the following new technologies that are in use today:

  • optical encoders

  • brushless DC motors

  • light pipes

  • complicated film handling mechanisms to move film at high speeds both linearly and in rotation

  • closed loop phase-lock servos

  • Kodak developed hi-resolution films both black and white and color

The incredible success we achieved really did provide so much intelligence for United States agencies and the military that enabled our government to make decisions that not only protected our security but helped keep peace in the world between 1971 and 1986, during the “cold war.”

 Credit must be given to over 1000 Perkin-Elmer employees   and of course to associated contractors, government agencies and Air Force and Navy personnel. In all of my work experience through retirement I have never worked with such a wonderful collection of smart and extremely competent people.

 They belonged to all of the following departments:

o  Systems engineering

o  Mechanical engineering

o  Electrical engineering

o  Design and drafting

o  Manufacturing

o  Optics

o  Testing

o  Quality assurance

o  Reliability

o  Technical documentation

o  Research

o  Program management

o  Sales and contracts

o  Upper management and technical staff

o  Administration and secretariat

o  Security

o  Machine shop

o  Building and facility staff

o  West coast field office

 I thank them all for their significant contributions and each time that I speak about Hexagon I honor them and Perkin-Elmer.

Phil Pressel

Fiftieth Anniversary of the July 20, 1969 Moon Landing

I found this interesting article about the moon landing that I had not heard about. It is not related to Hexagon but is interesting by itself and also that there was some work done at Perkin-Elmer related to the moon landing (not sure which program).

Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin were lost on the Moon. Really

 

 

•   06.22.19

Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin were lost on the Moon. Really

Neither NASA nor the Apollo 11 astronauts knew exactly where they were when they landed on the Moon. Yet it didn’t impede the mission.

 

[Photos: Joel Kowsky/NASA; Pavlo Stavnichuk/iStock; 1697726/Pixabay]

         




BY CHARLES FISHMAN4

 

Once Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin landed Eagle on the Moon, the Apollo 11 astronauts and their spaceship were actually lost.

Oh, Mission Control never lost radio contact with them. But NASA was never able to figure out where, exactly, on the Moon they had set down, while they were on the Moon. And NASA sure did try.

The landing area on the Moon that had been picked out for Apollo 11 was about the length of Manhattan and twice as wide. In photo surveys, it looked plain, flat, and bland—not interesting for geologists but a safe place to land a spaceship, the first time human beings ever tried that on a place off of Earth.

But up close, the Sea of Tranquility was anything but tranquil. As Armstrong and Aldrin flew down toward the Moon in their lunar module, Armstrong was looking out the window and the spot the autopilot was flying them toward was, as Armstrong described it, a crater the size of a football field, littered with boulders, some as large as cars.

 

Not a comfortable place to try to land a gangly four-legged spaceship.

So Armstrong took manual control of where the lunar module was flying to—the spaceship computer still did all the actual flying, but Armstrong was instructing it where to go and at what speed.

In the end, he and Aldrin set down several miles from the original landing spot—on safe, level Moon ground, but not where they had planned to land. Armstrong, in particular, had studied photographs of the Sea of Tranquility in preparation for flying to it and knew the landmarks and the landscape of much of the area.

Andrew Chaikin, in his account of the Moon landings, A Man On the Moon, describes Armstrong’s reaction to landing in unfamiliar Moon terrain: “As he looked out (at Tranquility Base), Armstrong wondered where he and Aldrin had landed . . . . (He) searched the horizon for some feature he might be able to identify, but found none.”

There had been some worry inside NASA about whether, from Earth, they would be able to pinpoint the lunar module’s landing location. The Moon was mapped, but not in anything like fine, up-close detail; there were no constellations of tracking satellites around the Moon in 1969. “With a wry smile, (Armstrong) radioed Houston, ‘The guys who said we wouldn’t know where we were are the winners today.’ ”

In the 22½ hours Armstrong and Aldrin were on the Moon in Eagle, NASA never found them. Their crewmate, Michael Collins, was overhead, orbiting the Moon in the command module Columbia. The command module had a telescope as part of its navigation instruments, and Mission Control asked Collins to search for the lunar module—and his crewmates—every time he flew over.

It was a bit of a wild request, even with a telescope: Collins was orbiting at 69 miles, looking down on a space bigger than Manhattan, trying to find a spaceship that, looking down from above, was just 31 feet across, with himself traveling at 3,700 mph.

According to Chaikin’s account, Collins had just two minutes to search the landing area during each overflight—using coordinates radioed up from Mission Control and which he programmed into the command module’s computer for help aiming the telescope.

“Each time (Collins) went around . . . Mission Control had a new set of coordinates for him to try.” But those search areas were often far off from each other, lending the effort a haphazard air. “It didn’t take Collins long to realize that no one had a handle on the problem. His search continued fruitlessly for the rest of his 22 solo hours.”

Among the tools that proved in vain: Armstrong and Aldrin actually carried with them, in their lunar module cabin, 95 detailed paper photo-maps of the landing area, but as they looked out from the windows of the lunar module cabin, and then walked around, they were unable to connect any of the nearby features they could see with the features on those maps.

One reason to know where you were on the Moon was to make navigating back to orbit–and the flight home–safer and easier. But even without those coordinates, on blastoff, the radar and computers in the lunar module and the command module had no trouble finding each other and guiding Armstrong and Aldrin back to rendezvous with Collins.

NASA was later able to figure out where Armstrong and Aldrin had been, and the Apollo 11 landing site at Tranquility Base has been photographed by orbiting Moon probes, including the bottom stage of the lunar module, along with the sites of the other five Moon landing bases.

The fact that no one actually knew, at the time, where Eagle had landed is a mostly overlooked fact of that first Moon landing, but it did make news at the time. “The Apollo 11 astronauts took off from the Moon today still uncertain of exactly where they had been,” opened the story in the New York Times. Still, the Times reassured readers, “It was abundantly clear that they had been on the surface of the Moon.”

 

 

 


Remembering President George H.W.Bush, and former CIA Director during Hexagon days

The following article published in “The Intelligencer Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies” was written by my friend Andy Vaart, the CIA’s Managing Editor of Studies in Intelligence. He has been involved in some of Perkin-Elmer’s past classified programs including Hexagon. He also served on the President’s Daily Briefing Staff, was an intelligence analyst, manager and editor of various intelligence publications. The article is a tribute to George H.W. Bush and his dedication to the CIA staff and especially to the importance in reading the Daily CIA Intelligence Briefings.

In Memoriam

Remembering President George H. W. Bush (1924–2018): The Model Consumer
Andres Vaart, Managing Editor, Studies in Intelligence

Over enough time, intelligence officers—at least this intelligence officer—might be inclined to mark epochs in their careers by the presidents they and the Intelligence Community have served. The death this past weekend of George Herbert Walker Bush brings to my mind, in both sadness and joy, a 12-year period in which intelligence was held in the highest regard by the most senior consum- er in the land. Much of the flavor of this tumultuous pe- riod is nicely reflected in recollections of President Bush that were rolled out in www.cia.gov the weekend after his death on the night of 30 November.

For those of us fortunate enough to have served on the President’s Daily Brief Staff during the 12-years Mr. Bush—as vice president and then president (1981–93)— received the PDB, no labor was too intense to produce the needed story and no hours were too many or too late to make certain we—the authors, the day and night editorial teams, the designers, and the briefers—made it good and got it right. This may have been true with later presidents, but what stood out with President Bush was that we, thanks to his dedicated briefers, Charles A. Peters (usually addressed as “Chuck” or “Pete”) and Henry (Hank) Ap- pelbaum (a predecessor of mine in my present job), knew well that the effort was truly appreciated. We heard it in daily debriefings, and we frequently saw it in handwritten personal notes. As a staff editor, even I received one.

We also saw through those interactions, as though at first hand, the humor and personality of a man who deeply cared about the people who served him. The former is re- flected in the opening passages of Chuck Peters’s Studies in Intelligence article in which he describes Vice Presi- dent Bush’s thinking in 1988 about the PDB were he to win the coming election and succeed President Reagan.a

a. Charles A. Peters, “Intelligence for the Highest Levels: Serving Our Senior Consumers,” Studies in Intelligence 39, no. 3 (Septem- ber 1995). Available in cia.gov FOIA Electronic Reading Room.

When he had finished the briefing, the Vice President said, “Pete, assuming all goes well at the convention and if I win in November, I want to change President Reagan’s practice of receiving The President’s Daily Brief (PDB) from his National Security Adviser. I want to continue these daily briefings by you and the staff.”

I was frankly flattered, but I reminded him that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), who was by statute his intelligence adviser, might have something to say about the arrangement.

“The DCI is welcome to attend whenever he wishes,” the Vice President said, “but the PDB session should be handled on a regular basis by the usual work- ing-level group.”

Of course, the convention came off without a hitch, and the Vice President won the election convincingly. On 21 January, the day after the inauguration, there- fore, we gathered for the first time in the Oval Office. Present, as was the custom in the Bush presidency, were Chief of Staff John Sununu, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, and Deputy National Secu- rity Adviser Bob Gates. DCI Webster also was there. (Image on the left.) And that led to the first of a long series of informal bits of byplay that were to mark our daily sessions.

When the President had finished reading, he turned
to me and said with deadly seriousness, “I’m quite satisfied with the intelligence support, but there is
one area in which you’ll just have to do better.” The DCI visibly stiffened. “The Office of Comic Relief,” the new President went on, “will have to step up its output.” With an equally straight face I promised the President we would give it our best shot. As we were leaving the Oval Office, I wasted no time in reassur- ing the Director that this was a lighthearted exchange typical of President Bush, and that the DCI did not

All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Studies in Intelligence Vol 62, No. 4 (December 2018) 1

In Memoriam

have to search out an Office of Comic Relief and authorize a major shakeup.

What would follow during his presidency were the addi- tion to the PDB of a section called “Signs of the Times,” which brought into the book the amusing, the idiosyncrat- ic, or the uncommon that might lighten, for a moment, the mood of an otherwise challenging and potentially de- pressing period. A couple of examples from Pete’s article.

Libyan intelligence chief recently passed message via Belgians laying out case for better relations with US and expressing desire to cooperate against terror- ism... even suggested he would like to contribute to your re-election campaign. (27January 1992)

French company says it has won contract to export vodka to Russia... deal apparently stems from short- age of bottles and bottling equipment... no word on whether Paris taking Russian wine in return. (25 July 1992)

Though not a reflection of humor, but of President Bush’s interest in people, especially in his counterparts abroad, the PDB introduced another element, briefs on the public activities of the president’s counterparts. We would learn that from time-to-time the president was inspired to call one of those leaders and chat with someone doing some- thing interesting.

President Bush’s personality also came through in his notes of thanks and in his expressions of concern to staff members when illness or tragedy struck. In reminiscing with Chuck Peters, he told me how he had written directly to Chuck’s son shortly after a family tragedy involving Chuck’s grandchild. Certainly President G. H. W. Bush knew of such tragedy and felt it for others. In years that followed his leaving office, I would, by virtue of still be- ing on current intelligence, become involved in relaying sentiments from and to him from various officers he had concerns about and come to learn was in need of encour- agement or congratulation. In this way, for example, Hank Appelbaum received the former president’s best wishes in 2010, when Hank was diagnosed with Parkinson’s Disease.a

a. Hank died of complications from the disease on 16 December 2018, and in Hank’s obituary, his family remembered the presdi- ent’s kindness.

While it became somewhat fashionable in recent years to downplay the president’s grasp of the issues of the day and his role in their evolution, the trend is hardly justi- fied in the minds of those who worked with him and for him. In John Helgerson’s book about briefing presidential candidates, Getting to Know the President, the former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence made clear the seri- ousness with which President Bush took his relationship with intelligence and how important a contribution that relationship made to his presidency.

Thinking back on the transition from his eight years as Vice President to the four years as President, Bush volunteered that there had been no real changes in his intelligence requirements after he moved up to be chief executive. “The big difference is that you have to make the decisions—that makes you read a lot more carefully.”

On becoming President, Bush had sought no sig- nificant alterations in the format or composition of the PDB. He had become comfortable with it over the previous eight years. Looking retrospectively, he judged that the mix of items addressed had been well suited to his needs. He attributed that suitability to the presence of the briefer while he read the mate- rial, making the Agency aware that he needed more or less on a given subject. Bush was sensitive to the fact that his National Security Adviser and Chief of Staff would occasionally discuss with senior Agency officers the purported need to include more items on a specific subject in the PDB. Referring to the efforts of his aides to determine what was provided in the PDB, Bush offered the decisive judgment that “I felt well supported on the full range of issues. Don’t let anybody else tell you what the President wants or needs in the PDB—ask him.”

CIA’s relationship with Bush was undoubtedly the most productive it had enjoyed with any of the nine presidents it served since the Agency’s founding
in 1947. Alone among postwar Presidents, he had served as CIA Director. Also uniquely, he succeed- ed to the presidency by election after receiving full intelligence support as Vice President. These circum- stances were obviously not of the CIA’s making and may never be repeated, but they made the Agency’s job immeasurably easier at the time.

2 Studies in Intelligence Vol 62, No. 4 (December 2018)

In Memoriam

The good relationship was also a result of Bush’s deep personal interest in developments abroad and his experience as a diplomat representing the United States in Beijing and at the United Nations. More than any other President, he was an experienced consumer of national-level intelligence. Also of critical importance was the fact that he had a highly capable and experienced National Security Adviser in Brent Scowcroft, who was determined to see that he received good intelligence support.

Bush was candid in telling CIA officers when he thought their analysis might be flawed and equally quick to commend them when they were helpful or identified an approaching key development before he did. There were many such developments because his presidency witnessed the most far-reaching interna- tional changes of the postwar period: the collapse of European Communism, the reunification of Germany, the disintegration of the USSR and the rollback of Russian imperialism, and the full-scale involvement of the United States in a ground war in the Middle East. On these, and on the lesser issues of Tiananmen Square, Haiti, Bosnia, or Somalia, President Bush was uniquely and extraordinarily well informed.a

And those of us who helped in the process were truly enriched.

vv v

a. John Helgerson, Getting to Know the President: Intel- ligence Briefings of Presidential Candidates, 1952–2004, Second Edition (Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2012). Available on https://www.cia.gov/library/center- for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and- monographs/getting-to-know-the-president/index.html

Studies in Intelligence Vol 62, No. 4 (December 2018) 3


Quisque iaculis facilisis lacinia. Mauris euismod pellentesque tellus sit amet mollis.
— Claire C.

Hexagon spy satellite overview by the SPIE

Karen Thomas of the SPIE (The International Society for Optics and Photonics) has written an article about the Hexagon KH-9 Spy Satellite. It tells about the last film based spy satellite and shows imagery photos of some strategic assets of denied territories and other domestic locations. It is available online at:


http://spie.org/newsroom/hexagon-kh-9-meeting-the-challenge

If anyone has questions or comments or has contributions (memories, stories, photos of people or things) about Hexagon for the blog, please contact phil.pressel@gmail.com